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On July 17, 1998, 120 nations voted to adopt the RomeStatute of the International Criminal Court (RomeStatute), establishing the world’s first permanent tri-
bunal for the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes. The adoption of the Rome Statute marked the end
of a four-year, multinational negotiating marathon. It also sig-
naled the end of the contentious, five-week “United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries” (Rome Confer-
ence) at which 21 nations abstained from voting, and seven
nations, including the United States, Israel, and China, opposed
adoption of the Rome Statute. The United States opposed the
Rome Statute because of its concern that it might one day have
to surrender a citizen, particularly a
member of its government or armed
forces, to the jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC). The
United States also feared, and con-
tinues to fear, that the ICC will deny
U.S. citizens the procedural due
process rights guaranteed to them
in the U.S. Constitution. Under the
Rome Statute, it is possible that the
ICC could subject a U.S. citizen to its
jurisdiction. In reality, however, the
narrow definition of the crimes, coupled with the Court’s fun-
damental principle of deferring to national judicial systems, vir-
tually negate that possibility. If, however, the remote possibil-
ity of a U.S. citizen being indicted by the Court were to arise,
it is important for the United States to note the congruency of
the Rome Statute with the U.S. Constitution.
The International Criminal Court
Pursuant to the Rome Statute, the ICC will be an indepen-
dent and permanent criminal tribunal, headquartered in The
Hague, The Netherlands (Article 3(1)). The Court will officially
come into existence once 60 nations have ratified the treaty (Arti-
cle 126). The nations that ratify the treaty constitute the Assem-
bly of States Parties (Assembly) (Article 112). After the Court
is created, the Assembly will elect, by a two-thirds majority vote,
18 judges to nine-year nonrenewable terms (Articles 36(6),
(9)). The Assembly also will elect, by an absolute majority vote,
one prosecutor and one or more deputy prosecutors to nine-
year non-renewable terms (Article 42(4)). As of November
2000, 115 states have signed the Rome Statute and 22 nations
have ratified it. Observers of the ICC expect the Court will
come into existence as early as 2002.
Once established, the Court will have jurisdiction over the
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
(Article 5). While ad hoc tribunals are formed only after the com-
mission of such crimes, the ICC aims to prevent these crimes
from occurring in the first place. Unlike the United Nations
International Court of Justice, which deals only with disputes
among states, the ICC will have jurisdiction over individuals,
including heads of state and other government representa-
tives. The ICC thus embodies the principle of individual account-
ability that the justices at Nuremberg defined more than half
a century ago: “crimes against international law are committed
by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing indi-
viduals who commit such crimes can the provisions of interna-
tional law be enforced.” The ICC’s strength thus lies in its
capacity to hold individuals responsible for committing the
most serious crimes of international concern. Yet it is the ram-
ifications of this principle of individual accountability that have
fueled the United States’ opposition to the Rome Statute. 
Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes
The Rome Statute provides the Court with jurisdiction over
genocide, which occurs when a perpetrator intends “to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group” (Article 6). The U.S. delegation to the Rome Conference,
led by David Scheffer, former U.S. ambassador-at-large for war
crimes, was not concerned that one of its citizens acting in an
official capacity as a soldier or government representative would
commit the crime of genocide. Rather, the team was concerned
that, under the language of the Rome Statute, the ICC could mis-
construe a peacekeeping, pre-emp-
tive defense, or other military action
by a U.S. citizen as a commission by
that citizen of either a crime against
humanity or a war crime. 
Under the Rome Statute, a crime
against humanity includes, inter alia,
murder, enslavement, torture,
apartheid, rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced preg-
nancy, enforced sterilization, or any
other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity (Article 7). Further, the individual must
commit the act as “part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population . . . pursuant to or in fur-
therance of a State or organizational policy to commit such an
attack” (Articles 7(1), (2)(a)). A war crime is defined under the
Rome Statute as a crime committed during an international or
internal conflict “as part of a plan or policy or as part of a
large-scale commission of such crimes” (Articles 8(1), (2)(b),
(2)(c)). Thus, in order for the ICC to charge an individual with
a crime against humanity or a war crime, the individual also must
be found guilty of having a policy or plan to intentionally kill
civilians. Therefore, under the language of the Rome Statute,
unintentional civilian casualties would not constitute either
the commission of a crime against humanity or a war crime.
Assuming, however, that the ICC considers indicting a U.S. cit-
izen for a crime against humanity or a war crime, the ICC’s prin-
ciple of complementarity to national judicial systems further safe-
guards any such U.S. citizen from coming under a direct
investigation or prosecution by the Court.
The Principle of Complementarity
One of the founding principles of the ICC is its creation as
a court that will act to complement, rather than to substitute,
national judicial systems (Preamble). The ICC’s function is not
to displace the criminal jurisdiction of any state, but rather to
serve as an alternative judicial forum for states that are either
“unwilling or unable genuinely” to prosecute a suspect on its own
accord (Article 17). A determination by a panel of ICC judges
that a state is “unable” to carry out an investigation or prose-
cution requires either a literal inability by the state to prosecute
the perpetrator, or “a total or substantial collapse or unavailability
of [the state’s] national judicial system” (Article 17(3)). It is
unlikely the United States would not be able to conduct a suf-
ficient judicial proceeding to satisfy the requirements of the
Rome Statute. Moreover, the likelihood of the U.S. judicial
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system suffering a total collapse at any time in the foreseeable
future is remote. Thus, the U.S. concern for its citizens appears
to turn on the definition of “unwillingness.” 
Under the Rome Statute, a panel of ICC judges is empow-
ered to determine that a state is unwilling to investigate or
prosecute a perpetrator only in three circumstances: when it
appears the proceedings are designed to shield the perpetrator
from criminal responsibility; when the proceedings have been
unjustifiably delayed so as not to bring the perpetrator to jus-
tice; or when the proceedings lack independence and impar-
tiality or are being conducted in a manner inconsistent with the
state’s intent to bring the perpetrator to justice (Article 17(2)).
Therefore, the ICC would directly prosecute a U.S. citizen only
if it ruled that the U.S. judicial process was so biased that it was
unwilling to carry out a valid investigation and prosecution of
an individual suspected of committing a crime of genocide, a
crime against humanity, or a war crime. 
Congressional Opposition to the Rome Statute
During the Rome Conference, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC),
chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declared
that the Rome Statute would be “dead on arrival” in Congress
unless the ICC incorporated a provision exempting all U.S.
citizens from its jurisdiction. Further, on June 14, 2000, the sen-
ator introduced a bill that would threaten the effect of the
ICC. Senate bill S. 2726, the American Servicemembers’ Pro-
tection Act of 2000 (Protection Act), grants U.S. military per-
sonnel, and many categories of elected and appointed officials
of the U.S. government, protection from investigation or pros-
ecution by the ICC. Also on June 14, Representative Tom DeLay
(R-TX) introduced a similar bill, H.R. 4654, in the House. 
The Protection Act prohibits all U.S. federal and state gov-
ernment entities, agencies, and courts from cooperating with
the ICC. Under the Protection Act, cooperation includes any
type of assistance relating to the investigation, arrest, extradi-
tion, or transit of suspects. In addition, the Protection Act pro-
hibits the U.S. president from sending U.S. troops to participate
in select UN peacekeeping operations occurring on territories
of states that have ratified the Rome Statute. The Protection Act
prohibits such U.S. military assistance because of the danger that
a U.S. servicemember could be found by the ICC to have
engaged in an activity that might render him or her account-
able before the ICC. Further, the Protection Act explicitly states
that, under the Rome Statute, U.S. citizens will “be denied
many of the procedural protections to which all U.S. citizens are
entitled under the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitu-
tion, including, among others, the right to trial by jury, the right
not to be compelled to provide self-incriminating testimony, and
the right to confront and cross-examine all witnesses for the pros-
ecution.” This statement, however, is not wholly accurate. Con-
trary to the Protection Act’s assertion, the Rome Statute is
consistent with the U.S. Constitution. 
Constitutionality of the Rome Statute 
The Rome Statute does not deny U.S. citizens their rights
under the U.S. Constitution. According to Yale Law School
Professor Ruth Wedgwood’s extensive study, there “is no for-
bidding constitutional obstacle to U.S. participation in the
treaty.” Wedgwood cites five reasons for this conclusion, three
of which will be addressed here. First, historically the United
States has signed treaties allowing U.S. participation in inter-
national tribunals that could affect the lives and property of U.S.
citizens. For example, the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment and the World Trade Organization subject U.S. busi-
nesses to judicial processes that do not mirror those found in
an American courtroom, i.e., fact-finding by a panel of judges
rather than by a jury. 
Second, the ICC does not offend U.S. constitutional notions
of due process because the Rome Statute, as carefully negotiated
by Scheffer and his team at the Rome Conference, comports with
the procedural protections and safeguards provided to U.S.
citizens under the U.S. Constitution. Wedgwood and Monroe
Leigh, a member of the American Bar Association, have com-
piled lists citing articles of the Rome Statute that both address
and guarantee due process rights. Their lists include, inter alia,
the right of the suspect: to have timely notice of charges filed
against him (Article 60(1)); to a presumption of innocence
(Articles 66(1), (2)); to the privilege against self-incrimination
(Articles 55(1)(a), (1)(b), 67(1)(g)); to the assistance of coun-
sel (Articles 55(2)(c), 67(1)(b), (1)(d)); to a speedy trial (Arti-
cle 67(1)(c)); to cross-examine adverse witnesses (Article
67(1)(e)); to innocence unless the prosecutor has proved guilt
“beyond reasonable doubt” (Article 66(3)); and to be present
at the trial (Article 63). 
Third, the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction under which
a U.S. citizen could be indicted are generally those that would
ordinarily be administered through the U.S. military courts-
martial system or through extradition of the U.S. suspect to the
foreign nation where the criminal violation occurred. Specifi-
cally in response to H.R. 4654, on July 25, 2000, Leigh submit-
ted a statement to the House Committee on International Rela-
tions in which he asserted the constitutionality of any potential
criminal proceedings by the ICC against a U.S. citizen. Leigh’s
statement emphasizes that members of the U.S. armed forces
are precluded the right to jury trials under the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution, which states: “No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases aris-
ing in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger.” Moreover, the language
of the Sixth Amendment, which concerns criminal trials, extends
the guarantee of a jury trial only to the state and district where
the crime was committed: “In all criminal proceedings, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed. . . .” Therefore, a person who commits
a crime in a foreign country risks extradition to that foreign
country and, accordingly, has no constitutional guarantee of a
jury trial.
In arguing that the Rome Statute does not offend U.S. con-
stitutional notions of due process, Wedgwood cites three
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procedural provisions of the Rome Statute that distinguish the
ICC from U.S. common law procedures. First, the Rome Statute
provides for the use of a fact-finding panel of judges rather than
a jury (Articles 34, 39(2)(b)(ii), 74). As discussed above, historic
U.S. treaty participation already subjects U.S. citizens to this pro-
cedure. Second, verdicts rendered by the ICC are by a vote of
at least two judges (Article 74(3)). Finally, the ICC prosecutor
may file an appeal based on errors of fact, law, and procedure
(Article 81(1)(a)). Because U.S. citizens who commit crimes
abroad are generally subject to the rules either of foreign courts
or of the U.S. military courts-martial system, it is safe to assume
that a U.S. citizen could encounter these same rules of proce-
dure in a foreign country. In addition, U.S. courts-martial rules
similarly stipulate that verdicts, in cases of acts resulting in
unintentional civilian casualties or other unintentional harms,
need not be rendered by a unanimous vote: “a finding of guilty
results only if at least two-thirds of the members present vote for
a finding of guilty” (R.C.M.921(c)(2)(B)). 
Further, the United States has the capacity to ensure the con-
stitutionality of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence
(Rules) before committing itself to the provisions of the Rome
Statute. At the signing of the Rome Statute, the Rome Confer-
ence adopted Resolution F, mandating the establishment of a
Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) to complete draft texts
commutation from the Jamaican Privy Council violated their
right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of their sen-
tence under Article 4(6) of the American Convention. The
Jamaican Privy Council may pardon or commute a death sen-
tence under Articles 90 and 91 of the Constitution of Jamaica,
but prisoners have no procedural guarantees.
Decision: On April 13, 2000, the Commission ruled Jamaica
had violated Articles 4(1), 5(1), 5(2), 8(1), and 4(6) of the Con-
vention by disallowing the petitioners to present mitigating
evidence at an individualized sentencing hearing before impos-
ing the death penalty. The Commission found the Jamaican Privy
Council’s power to grant a pardon or commute a death sentence
does not serve as a form of judicial review because under
Jamaican law the petitioners have no effective right to apply for
this form of discretionary relief. The Commission recommended
the State commute the death sentences and offer the petition-
ers compensation. Additionally, the Commission recommended
Jamaica adopt domestic legislation requiring the death penalty
be imposed only in accordance with the American Convention
and pass legislation allowing criminal defendants to apply for
amnesty, pardon, or commutation of the death penalty.
The “Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru”
On June 2, 2000, the Commission issued the “Second Report
on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru” (Report), following
an on-site visit in November 1998. The Report described mea-
sures implemented by the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of government, restricting the right of political par-
ticipation of its citizens, as guaranteed by Article 23 of the Con-
vention. The Commission criticized the Peruvian Intelligence
Service’s (SIN) use of wiretapping, espionage and physical sur-
veillance to harass and intimidate opposition presidential can-
didates. In documenting the State’s interference in citizens’ par-
ticipation in the political process, the Commission referred to
contentious cases from Peru currently under review, previously
decided, or already submitted to the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. These included the Case of Mariela Barreto Rio-
fano, the Case of Susana Higuchi Miyagawa, and the Case of Baruch
Ivcher Bronstein.
The Commission also reviewed reports by the Organization of
American States Electoral Observation Mission, the Commis-
sion’s Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, the Peruvian
Human Rights Ombudsman, and non-governmental organizations
within Peru that observed the April 9, 2000, presidential and leg-
islative elections. These reports documented serious abnormal-
ities and persistent inequities in the voting process, including the
tallying of the votes. Consequently, the Electoral Observation Mis-
sion and other election monitoring organizations decided against
observing the second round of elections on May 28, 2000, which
ultimately declared Fujimori the winner of the presidency. The
Commission concluded the 2000 elections were not free and
fair in light of international standards enshrining the right of polit-
ical participation. The Commission further held that Peru should
hold another election, guaranteed to be free and fair, within a
reasonable time period, to uphold the rule of law and guarantee
the right of political participation. As of November 27, 2000,
Fujimori has resigned the presidency and been replaced by for-
mer congressman Valentin Paniagua. 
* Terri J. Harris is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law. 
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The Global Court, continued from page 16 Ratifications of the ICC Statute as of November 2000.
COUNTRY DATE OF RATIFICATION
Senegal February 2, 1999
Trinidad and Tobago April 6, 1999
San Marino May 13, 1999
Italy July 26, 1999
Fiji November 29, 1999
Ghana December 20, 1999
Norway February 16, 2000
Belize April 5, 2000
Tajikistan May 5, 2000
Iceland May 25, 2000
Venezuela June 7, 2000
France June 9, 2000
Belgium June 28, 2000
Canada July 7, 2000
Mali August 16, 2000
Lesotho September 6, 2000
New Zealand September 7, 2000
Botswana September 8, 2000
Luxembourg September 8, 2000
Sierra Leone September 15, 2000
Gabon September 21, 2000
Spain October 25, 2000
continued on  page 30
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Crimes of War provides an informative overview of war crimes
and the laws designed to limit them. Consistent with the book’s
educational mission, the reader obtains a useful foundation for
evaluating current and future events. Although the book’s
alphabetical organization, numerous contributors, and wide
range of subject matter make for a somewhat uneven read, on
the whole, it is an invaluable reference.
In addition to Professor Anderson’s contribution as legal edi-
tor, WCL Professor Diane Orentlicher provided the essay,
“Genocide,” and WCL Professor Robert Goldman, assisted by
then-WCL L.L.M. candidate Ewen Allison, provided seven
entries, including “Belligerent Status,” “Civil Patrols,” and
“Illegal or Prohibited Acts.” Royalties from the book support the
Crimes of War Project, a non-profit organization based at Amer-
ican University that seeks to raise awareness about interna-
tional humanitarian law. 
* Anne Theodore Briggs is a joint-degree J.D./M.B.A. candidate at
the Washington College of Law. Matthew R. Briggs holds a Masters
degree in Military and Diplomatic History from The George Wash-
ington University.
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person alone cannot make a difference, stating, “if you feel that
you’re too small to do anything, then you’ve never been in bed
with a mosquito.”
In response to a directed question from Professor Tigar,
Guillaume Ngefa Atondoko described the role of international
actors in exacerbating African wars. He derided the United
States for claiming to support the rule of law in Africa while ignor-
ing the suffering of more than 400 million people throughout
the continent and warned that U.S. taxpayer dollars are used to
support murderous policies abroad. As a response to this type
of insidious foreign involvement, Mr. Ngefa’s organization is
exploring how to link traditional war crimes and crimes against
humanity with the nascent concept of economic war crimes.
Professor Martin next asked a question eliciting the advocates’
opinions regarding the international community’s efforts to
address human rights issues. Harry Wu expressed his concern
that the Western world, and in particular the United States,
seems willing to dismiss human rights violations in China as
cultural traditions. He noted the mutability of traditions, describ-
ing how France, a country once best known for the invention of
the guillotine, now bans the death penalty.  Mr. Wu expressed
his hope that in the future, Western policy makers will not use
the concept of tradition as an excuse to refrain from holding
China accountable for its human rights violations. Digna Ochoa
focused on the positive impact of international solidarity, explain-
ing that it helps protect human rights defenders from govern-
mental retribution for their work. Moreover, she noted that
publicizing Mexican human rights violations abroad discourages
the government from committing such abuses because of its fears
of losing international economic investment as a result.
In closing, Ariel Dorfman, Walter Hines Page Research Pro-
fessor of Literature and Latin American Studies at Duke Uni-
versity, playwright, and author of a theatrical presentation based
on the defenders’ lives, reiterated how the defenders use the
power of truth to challenge the status quo.  Unwilling to turn away
from the ugly and the horrific, these activists threaten not only
state perpetrators of human rights violations, but also the com-
placency shared by many of the privileged around the world. As
Ms. Kennedy-Cuomo states in the introduction to her book,
“[t]heir determination, valor, and commitment in the face of
overwhelming danger challenge each of us to take up the torch
for a more decent society. Today we are blessed by the presence
of these people. They are teachers, who show us not how to be
saints, but how to be fully human.” 
* Sarah C. Aird is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
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defining the Rules and the Elements of the Crimes (Elements)
on or before June 30, 2000. Although the United States is not
a signatory to the Rome Statute, it has nonetheless taken an active
role in drafting both the Rules and the Elements to be used by
the Court once it officially comes into existence. In addition, the
PrepCom agreed in June 2000 to extend considerations to
exempt U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the Court until the
PrepCom’s next meeting in November and December of this
year. Because the Rome Statute is open for signature at the
United Nations Headquarters in New York until December 31,
2000, the United States still has the opportunity to adopt the
Rome Statute (Article 125). Therefore, should the United States
choose to endorse the creation of the ICC, it will have a chance
to review the final texts of the Rules prior to signing the treaty. 
Conclusion
Although prior to the Rome Conference the Clinton admin-
istration advocated a world criminal court, the efforts of the U.S.
delegation team at the Rome Conference do not reflect such a
desire. Rather, their efforts reveal an American attempt to shape
a court that would not pose a threat to U.S. citizens. Even before
the U.S. delegation team headed to Rome during the summer
of 1998, the U.S. State Department issued a statement signaling
an impending U.S. opposition to the ICC: “The American armed
forces have a unique peacekeeping role, posted to hot spots
around the world. Representing the world’s sole remaining
superpower, American soldiers on such missions stand to be
uniquely subject to frivolous, nuisance accusations by parties of
all sorts. And [the United States] simply cannot be expected to
expose [its] people to those sorts of risks.” Accordingly, some
might argue the United States sought the creation of a global
court only insofar as the term “global” would exclude the United
States.
Aside from U.S. opposition to the Rome Statute, the accom-
plishments of the Rome Conference mark an historic and impor-
tant step toward ending the traditional impunity of those who
commit the most offensive crimes. Perhaps the most remarkable
aspect of the Rome Conference is the overwhelming international
support for the creation of a permanent world criminal court.
The consensus achieved in the ICC’s creation is testament to the
international community’s unified position of intolerance toward
crimes against humanity and other egregious crimes.
* Teresa Young Reeves is a J.D. Candidate at the Washington College
of Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief. 
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